Dams and Dynasty, and the Colonial Transformation of Balinese Irrigation Management by Schulte Nordholt, Henk
Dams and Dynasty, and the Colonial Transformation
of Balinese Irrigation Management
Henk Schulte Nordholt
# The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This article takes issue with Stephen Lansing’s
bottom-up model of Balinese irrigation management. Based
on archival research and extensive fieldwork in the former
south Balinese kingdom of Mengwi, it is argued that in pre-
colonial days large scale irrigation depended largely on
dynastic involvement. During the colonial period (1906–
1942) the Dutch took over the role of regional irrigation
management while they strengthened the autonomy of local
irrigation associations.
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Introduction
Colonial and post-colonial anthropological literature has
paid inadequate attention to the involvement of the
aristocracy in large scale irrigation in pre-colonial Bali. It
has one-sidedly emphasized the cooperative—and even
autonomous—nature of local irrigation networks (Grader
1960; Geertz 1980). Stephen Lansing has modified this
conceptualization (1987, 2006, 2007). He also emphasizes
the autonomous and bottom-up nature of local irrigation
management, but adds an important qualification by
arguing that regional irrigation management centered upon
extended temple networks which culminated in the Batur
temple complex in central Bali. In doing so, he seems to
downplay, or even ignore, the role played by regional
dynasties and noble lords in the pre-colonial period, while
he also seems to underestimate the structural changes which
took place at the beginning of the colonial period during the
first decades of the twentieth century. Although he is aware
that I wrote about irrigation in Bali during the pre-colonial
era and the colonial period, for reasons which are not entirely
clear to me, he only refers to this in a very restricted
manner.
1 It is true that my work is focused on another area in
Bali—i.e., the southern rice plains of Mengwi and Badung—
where conditions were perhaps different from the findings
of his research—i.e., in uphill Bangli and Gianyar (central
Bali)—but my conclusions contradict both Lansing’s model
and the implicit claim in his work that it is applicable for
the whole of Bali. In the following pages I will therefore
summarize my findings because they offer an alternative
picture of irrigation management in pre-colonial Bali.
Dynasty and Irrigation in Pre-colonial South Bali
2
Control of manpower was one of the main objectives of the
pre-colonial contest states in Southeast Asia and the south
1 See Lansing 2007: 34, where he briefly refers to my description of
the role played by a regional dynasty in irrigation. He then concludes
that ‘only fragments of the irrigation system came under the control of
even the most powerful princes,’ suggesting that the nobility had no
grip on the irrigation system, which is precisely not what I am
arguing. Elsewhere Lansing also refers briefly to my book. He quotes
me as follows: ‘“The ‘power’ that upheld the theatre state remains an
enigma,” observed the Dutch historian Schulte Nordholt; “from where
does it emanate, how is it organized, who controls it?” [Schulte
Nordholt 1996:7 ] ’ (Lansing 2006: 21). Lansing suggests that these
are questions regarding the pre-colonial state in Bali which I am
apparently unable to resolve. In reality, however, this sentence is part
of my criticism of Clifford Geertz’s famous study Negara (1980). In
the remainder of my book I do suggest a set of answers, to which
Lansing pays no further attention.
2 This section is primarily based on Schulte Nordholt 1996:5 5 –62.
For detailed references to source material see Schulte Nordholt 1996.
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exception in this respect. Parallel to the numerous vertical
relations between lords and followers unstable connections
developed between a number of large dams and the
irrigated rice fields of the ordinary people. There was a
correspondence between the expanding control of the
dynasty over manpower and an increased grip on the
irrigation systems in the region. Contrary to Lansing’s
model there is ample evidence that the Mengwi dynasty
was closely involved in the construction, upkeep, and the—
mostly ritual—regulation of the irrigations systems. The
irrigation order can only be understood in connection with
the royal hierarchy.
Three rivers, the Sungi, Penet and Ayung, descend the
sloping Mengwi region which fans out from the mountains
to the sea. Because the rivers cut deep gorges it was no easy
to lead the water to the rice fields. Sometimes the water
level of the river was dozens of feet below the rice fields, so
that in order to irrigate them a dam had to be constructed
many miles upstream. The water that was collected at those
dams had to be diverted via lengthy conduits and tunnels
before it reached the downstream rice fields.
The construction of these central dams required the
mobilization of a large amount of manpower which was
controlled and coordinated by either the dynasty or other
local princes. In many oral histories, which I collected
during my fieldwork in the early 1980s throughout the
Mengwi region, mention is made that the king or a local
l o r do r d e r e dt h ec l e a r i n go fl a n da n do r g a n i z e dt h e
construction of upstream dams. Especially the Mengwi
dynasty was involved in the establishment of large
irrigation systems. The rise of the dynasty went hand in
hand with the expansion of irrigated rice fields in the
region.
Dynastic involvement was required because most vil-
lages had a limited range of action and cooperation between
villages was often lacking. Dynastic involvement was
therefore necessary in order to protect and maintain the
vulnerable irrigation systems. Upkeep demanded manpower
and so did reconstruction work since the large earthen dams
quickly eroded in the fast-flowing rivers and were often
wiped out suddenly at the start of the rainy season by a
flash flood. As an example of the mechanisms by which
this happened, one of the large dams in the river Ayung,
dam Oongan which was some 55 ft in height, tended to
undermine itself because overflow water was diverted at the
downstream side of the dam. Moreover, major conduits and
tunnels required regular inspection, while the entire system
had to be guarded against sabotage and external attacks. It
is true that small-scale cooperation at the local level was an
important feature of irrigation in Bali and this is certainly
true for the twentieth century. However, without water such
cooperation could not be materialized. None but regional
dynasties and local lords were able to guarantee the
continuity of this fragile system.
3
The geographical location of the dynastic centre of
Mengwi and a number of its satellites should be understood
within the broader context of south Balinese irrigation. It is
said that the first king of Mengwi together with a local lord
who resided north of the dynastic centre built a dam in the
river Sungi and proceeded to expand rice fields in his
domain. As a result the dynastic centre was located in a
wide fertile plain some 200 m above sea level where
surplus for the dynasty was produced. While the newly
constructed dam was guarded by the northern lord, an
important side effect was that it also allowed the dynastic
centre to influence downstream irrigation. In case of
emergency the king was able to cut off the water supply
to the domains of southern lords. This happened in the
nineteenth century during prolonged conflicts between the
royal centres of Mengwi and Badung, and Bangli and
Gianyar.
Because the political system in Bali was fragmented
there was no monopoly of power at the centre. Conse-
quently the king was not able to control all irrigations
systems in his realm. There was, in other words, no such
thing as ‘Oriental despotism.’ Satellites of the dynasty and
other lords were in control of their own irrigations systems.
The lord of Sibang, for instance, had his own dam twenty
miles upstream in the river Ayung which was located in the
domain of another lord. The lord of Sibang had moved a
group of trusted followers with their families to the north in
order to maintain and protect the dam.
The lord of Sibang not only looked after his own dam,
but he was also responsible for the upkeep of another big
dam in the Ayung River. This was the Gumasih dam,
located north of the village of Mambal. Little is known
about the construction of this dam but in the course of the
eighteenth century it became the biggest irrigation project
in south Bali providing water for thousands of hectares of
rice fields in the southern part of the Mengwi kingdom.
4
The entire system was spread over the domains of several
lords. Much of the upkeep of this complex system, which
included a long tunnel, was delegated to lesser lords and
lower units, but, the dynastic centre was ultimately
responsible for the overall supervision. This supervision
was vital because the system went beyond the restricted
interests of its constituent parts. In this context neither
bottom up coordination based on autonomous local
irrigation units was able to manage this huge system, nor
3 See also Happé 1915; Korn 1927; Van Naerssen 1918; Sörensen
1921.
4 According to oral tradition the dam was first constructed by the lord
of Mambal who was later defeated by the Mengwi dynasty. In the
early 1980s the dam Mambal irrigated over 6,000 hectares of rice
fields.
22 Hum Ecol (2011) 39:21–27is there any indication that it was solely managed by
temples without any dynastic involvement. On the contrary,
without the Mengwi dynasty the irrigation system of the
Gumasih dam was simply unthinkable.
Lansing (2007: 34) seems to downplay the importance of
dynastic involvement in south Bali but offers no evidence
that contradicts my findings. Irrigation management was
decentralized as much as possible but depended ultimately
on dynastic coordination. The king and local lords had a
group of functionaries (or sedahan) at their disposal who
were responsible for timely repair of the dams and conduits,
water allocation to irrigation units, and the collection of
taxes. They also supervised the rice fields which directly
belonged to their lord. Most of the tax was levied from rice
fields which were distributed among followers who were
given access to rice fields in exchange for labor and loyalty.
This system was very common in the Mengwi kingdom. On
this point, Clifford Geertz (1980: 67) presented a contrast-
ing view regarding pre-colonial Bali that there was no
‘systematic congruence […] between the structure of
political authority, the structure of land tenure, and the
distribution of land tenancy.’ However, all the data I was
able to collect indicate the opposite. In pre-colonial
Mengwi there was a strong coherence between political
power, the distribution of land, and between the owner and
the worker of the land, which is illustrated by the following
example from the area of Sibang:
When the dam at Sibang was built, many rice fields
around Sibang were opened up. The lord of Sibang
reserved the largest slice of these for his own
household. Most of the remaining fields were divided
among his relatives. Each of them received a larger or
smaller (side) canal, and they could allocate the land
on either side of it to their personal followers. Trusted
favorites received a larger piece of land, while
ordinary followers were given about two acres.
ThelordofSibangselectedthebestfieldforhisownuse
and his slaves grew the crop for his household. The
other ricefieldswerecalledpecatu and were distributed
among his personal followers. They were obliged to
perform services for their lord, but were allowed to
retain the complete harvest. Only a small portion of it
had to be paid to the lord as tax. A follower whose
loyalty and service towards the lord were found
wanting would lose access to his land and was to be
ousted from the circle of followers.
5
In the course of the eighteenth century irrigation
expanded rapidly under the encouragement of the Mengwi
dynasty. But this did not mean that the king centrally
controlled the whole. His control over manpower in his
kingdom was limited to his own domain and so was his
direct control over irrigation matters. Local lords, like the
one in Sibang, managed their own decentralized systems
and were in control of their own followers. As a result the
fragmented control of manpower paralleled the distribution
of irrigation water. In fact the top of the irrigation systems
was as vulnerable as the apex of the dynastic hierarchy. A
weak king or a weak dam could both cause the total system
to collapse. Conversely, the irrigation order and the
dynastic hierarchy could only be maintained if the royal
centre was strong (see Fig. 1).
The correlation between these two hierarchies was
expressed in a telling way. Until recently it was custom
that in the villages of Kapal and Sibang, prior to starting to
work on the rice fields, a procession would carry a sacred
dynastic dagger (or keris) to the central dam. There the
blade was pushed into the dam accompanied by various
rituals, a result of which the powers that resided in the
dagger would be infused into the dam. There is indirect
evidence that similar rituals used to be held in connection
with the dam north of the dynastic centre of Mengwi. This
suggests that the relation between a strong ruler and a
sturdy dam was crucial, because dynastic hierarchy and a
smooth irrigation order supported and reinforced each
other. The relationship between dynasty and irrigation
management also confirms the important role kingship
played in guaranteeing the continuity of fertility in the
realm, which found its expression in the parallel circulation
of water and the human soul between mountains, down-
stream valleys and the sea.
6
How vulnerable both the dynastic and the irrigation
orders were is nicely illustrated by a Balinese historical
song, the Kidung Nderet, in which a major crisis of the
Mengwi dynasty during the early 1820s is told an
analyzed.
7 Due to poor leadership in the centre of the
dynasty both the hierarchy of lords and followers and the
irrigation order fell apart. An important part of the story
concerns the mismanagement of the dam Gumasih near
Mambal. During the reign of king Cokorda Munggu (174?–
1780) the responsibility for the dam, the tunnel and
conduits, and part of the rice fields that received water
from the dam was given to one of his sons. This man was
also entitled to levy tax with which the upkeep of the dam
and tunnel was paid. Under the new king, however, the
5 Schulte Nordholt 1996: 60. Based on an interview with Gusti Agung
Putu Gedong from puri Gedong in Sibang in 1983. Elsewhere in the
Mengwi region both members of the nobility as well as commoners
told me similar stories. In the Mengwi region at least 50% of the rice
fields were pecatu lands during the pre-colonial period, involving a
lord—follower relationship (Schulte Nordholt 1996: 129).
6 Schulte Nordholt 1996: 143–158. The vital relationship between
kingship and fertility is largely absent in Geertz’ Negara (1980), nor is
it discussed at any length by Lansing.
7 Schulte Nordholt 1993; 1996: 100–108; Kidung Nderet (1870).
23 Hum Ecol (2011) 39:21–27dynastic centre withdrew this privilege and resumed direct
control over the irrigation system of dam Gumasih while it
also centralized the taxation. But, when the dam and the
tunnel needed repair, the dynastic centre did not act
appropriately, as a result of which large parts of the southern
ricefieldsdidnotreceiveanywater,whereaspeasantsstillhad
to pay tax. Unrest evolved eventually into protest and warfare
withneighboringkingdoms,whichledtoahumiliatingdefeat.
The interesting point here is that this Balinese text written in
the nineteenth century also emphasizes the close connection
between dynasty and irrigation.
8
Around the middle of the nineteenth century the
Mengwi dynasty managed to recover. Part of the
recovery was the extension of rice fields in the north-
8 In a private conversation in 1991 the late professor Clifford Geertz
admitted reluctantly that he would have given a different picture of the
nineteenthcentury BalineseNegara ifhe hadknown theKidung Nderet.
Fig. 1 Mengwi in the eighteenth
century (from Schulte Nordholt
1996: 54)
24 Hum Ecol (2011) 39:21–27eastern region of the Mengwi kingdom which involved
the building of dams, tunnels and temples.
9 This was to
a large extent a top-down operation coordinated by the
leading lineage of the dynastic centre. Most likely, the
actual organization of the various irrigation systems in
pre-colonial Bali differed widely per locality depending on
the political and ecological context. In most instances,
however, lord-follower relationships informed the lines
along which these systems were organized. As far as can
be determined, extension of irrigated fields did not
automatically result in the establishment of (semi) auton-
omous local irrigation units, or subak, which operated
independently from villages. Oral traditions concerning
this period suggest a different picture. Without exception,
informants emphasized the leading role of the nobility in
the project while they did not mention subak as separate
organizations. Instead, they mentioned the village as the
provider of labor. The term subak did exist though, but
referred to a person rather than to an autonomous
irrigation association. This official was the lowest link in
the regional irrigation hierarchy who was also responsible
for the collection of a royal tax on the use of irrigation
water, the suwinih. The dynastic centre used this tax to
finance large rituals in the newly built irrigation temples.
These temples fostered in the first place the fertility of the
land and averted plagues. The temples and rituals were
supervised by irrigation officials while the dynastic
involvement was restricted to the granting of permission
to stage certain rituals. However, as soon as ritual and
maintenance were neglected and disorder could erupt, it
was the duty of the power holders to restore order and
hierarchy. It is for this reason that Pura Arantaja, the main
irrigation temple of the northeastern region of Mengwi,
was commonly called ‘pura kerajaan’, or royal temple.
Accordingly, this temple represented not only the link
between gods, fertility, and men, but was also a reminder
of royal authority in the region.
So far, I have found no evidence that supports
Lansing’s bottom up model of irrigation management
exclusively handled by temple systems. Instead, we see a
complex but integrated system in which dynasties,
temples, and peasants participated and hierarchical
relationships and horizontal collaboration were com-
bined. In this system upstream irrigation was primarily
coordinated and protected by the dynasty, while down-
stream irrigation was to a large extent a local affair.
Labor was mobilized both for local purposes as well as
for large scale upstream projects on dams and conduits.
In terms of daily routine the system was as much as
possible decentralized but the system as a whole
depended in the end on dynastic coordination. Dynasties,
and not temples, were the key institutions that guaran-
teed the continuity of the system.
Colonial Transformations
Soon after the Dutch had conquered south Bali at the
beginning of the twentieth century, colonial administrators
started to reorganize local society according to Orientalist
models of a supposed authentic Bali in which the village
played a central role. Since the ‘enlightened’ Dutch had
replaced the ‘despotism’ of the kings, they aimed, accord-
ing to this view, to ‘repair’ the ‘damage’ inflicted upon Bali
by ‘arbitrary royal rule.’
10 Apart from the reorganization of
village administration, which also served to mobilize a
reservoir of labor, irrigation became another object of
colonial interference, which ultimately aimed to levy an
increasing amount of tax.
11
Based on research conducted by the colonial adminis-
trator F.A. Liefrinck in north Bali the Dutch started to
‘restore’ south Balinese society to its ‘original’ state.
12. His
description of the northern Balinese irrigation association
(subak) was taken as the normative standard for the
reorganization of irrigation management in south Bali.
There were, however, significant ecological differences
between north and south Bali. The north featured small-
scale irrigation systems without direct aristocratic interfer-
ence, whereas the south had large scale systems which
depended on big dams and dynastic involvement.
13
Contrary to north Bali, the organization of irrigation in
the south varied by locality while boundaries between
village and subak were often fluid. Liefrinck had presented
a uniform model in which no consideration was given to
local variation or direct aristocratic involvement. As he saw
it, dynastic interference was essentially unrelated to the
subak, but it had penetrated into the local networks in order
to appropriate taxes. This point of view reflected a very
common Orientalist view of that time which favored the
autonomyoflocalinstitutionswhichhadtobeprotectedunder
benigncolonialrule.ItseemsthatLansing’sideaswereatleast
partially influenced by this colonial perception.
Lansing argues that the Dutch deliberately sought to
restore the centralized irrigation hierarchy of the former
kingdoms and that they even employed archaeologists to
legitimize this project (Lansing 2007:3 5 –36). I wonder on
12 Liefrinck 1886–7.
9 Schulte Nordholt 1996: 128–131.
11 Schulte Nordholt 1996: 246–255; 284–286.
10 See for an elaborate analysis of the ‘making of traditional Bali’,
Schulte Nordholt 1999.
13 However, also in north Bali kings issued local irrigation regulations.
See Liefrinck 1921: 310–370, for a collection of these regulations
from the nineteenth century.
25 Hum Ecol (2011) 39:21–27what evidence this statement is based. Actually, the Dutch
did the opposite, at least on paper.
Using Liefrinck’s model, the colonial administrators
in the south observed that little was left of the supposed
‘original’ egalitarian subak.I n1 9 0 7t h e ye m b a r k e d
i m m e d i a t e l yu p o na na m b i t i o u sr e s t o r a t i o np r o g r a m .I n
the same year it was reported that in the Mengwi area the
subak had been ‘restored’ in conformity with the north
Balinese model.
14 What in fact happened, however, was
that this so-called restoration fitted the needs of the
colonial state. A memorandum on the former kingdom of
Klunkung by the Dutch administrator of Bali, Resident G.
F. de Bruyn Kops in 1908 illustrates this nicely:
The irrigation system, too, ought to be overhauled
drastically. In the days of the kings […] all the nobles
and prominent people had their own tax collector who
made sure that his own land was watered aplenty.
Urgently needed is a separation between irrigation
workers and administrative personnel; a division of
irrigation areas, headed by a supervisor must be
designed; the subak have to be assigned in groups to
avoid too large a number of subak heads which would
impede administrative control.
15
Within a few years the Dutch succeeded in replacing the
plurality of relationships from the pre-colonial period with an
overarching colonial bureaucracy. For ordinary Balinese
peasants the colonial reorganization marked the beginning of
much confusion. Apart from administrative amalgamations,
they were confronted with new officials and new or redefined
terms and titles. In each former kingdom, which had become
an administrative district, a Balinese official (sedahan agung)
was appointed who supervised a number of lower officials
(sedahan) who on their turn both supervised the distribution
of irrigation water and the levying of new colonial taxes.
While the term subak was known as a local irrigation leader
in the Mengwi area, it now became the name of the local
irrigation association all over Bali. The Dutch introduced a
new term for the subak leader, i.e., pekaseh, which was taken
from the neighboring kingdom of Gianyar. These termino-
logical shifts were not insurmountable, but great confusion
ensued when the Dutch started to reorganize the actual
irrigation networks. Bureaucratic and administrative criteria
prevailed to the extent that irrigation networks had to
coincide with administrative borders. This implied that quite
a number of irrigation districts no longer formed coherent
ecological systems as a result of which the proper flow of
water was seriously hampered. Moreover, small irrigation
units were amalgamated to form fewer and bigger irrigation
associations which were organized according to a uniform
model. In this way the basis was laid for a new colonial
system of taxation. Within ten years the twelve irrigation
districts that had been formed in the former kingdoms of
Badung and Mengwi in 1907 were reduced to six. These
amalgamationsledtoirrigationareasofsucha sizethatproper
coordination was no longer possible. Whereas in former days
a large number of sedahan had coordinated these tasks, these
fell now to a single official who was often not familiar with
local conditions. The distance between peasants and officials
at the regional level increased due to a process of ongoing
bureaucratization. Since the Dutch preferred candidates with
bureaucratic skills in order to collect taxes, there was a loss of
expertise in irrigation matters.
Amalgamation not only affected regional irrigation man-
agement, but local arrangements as well. Countless small
irrigation associations were amalgamated into new and bigger
subak. To some extent however, the old cooperative arrange-
ments continued to function as sub-units, or munduk or
tempek, within larger subak. The difference was, however,
that these sub-units depended for water supply on the larger
subak and its head.
Perhaps the most important structural change took
place from 1914 onwards when the old vulnerable
earthen dams and conduits were gradually replaced by
new strong concrete constructions. Since the Dutch had
conquered the south Balinese kingdoms, dynastic con-
trol of dams and main conduits was discontinued. As a
result some large dams collapsed between 1909 and
1914 and hundreds of hectares of rice fields fell dry.
From now on the Dutch were responsible for irrigation
at the regional level. Between 1914and1931fourconcrete
dams were build in the Ayung River which together irrigated
12,763 hectares of rice fields.
16 Lansing does not seem to be
fully aware of the fundamental changes this brought to
irrigation management.
In contrast to the pre-colonial period these new perma-
nent constructions guaranteed a steady supply of water
flowing to the rice fields. The responsibility for the building
and maintenance of the new concrete structures fell under a
separate institution of the colonial state, the Public Utilities
Service, which replaced the mobilization of labor under
dynastic supervision. Consequently, the manifold connec-
tions between local irrigation associations and central water
supply, which involved in the pre-colonial period the
regular mobilization of hundreds of people by dynastic
officials to repair the central dam and the main conduits,
14 KITLV, Collection V.E. Korn no. 97, Monthly Report, August
1907, by Assistant Resident of South Bali, H.J.E.F. Schwartz. 16 These were dam Oongan (built between 1914–1929, irrigating
3,284 hectares), dam Praupan (1920–1924, 365 ha.), dam Mambal
(1926–1927, 6,000 ha.), and dam Kadewatan (1927–1931, 3,150 ha.).
15 Memorandum Resident G.F. de Bruyn Kops September 8, 1908,
Colonial Archive V 15-9-1909 no. 30, National Archives The Hague.
26 Hum Ecol (2011) 39:21–27fell into disuse. Moreover, colonial pacification made an
end to regional warfare which had often threatened the
continuity of the irrigation process.
It was only because of these new conditions that for
the peasants in south Bali irrigation became primarily a
local affair. Ironically, it was this colonial intervention
which was instrumental in achieving the colonial image
of the ‘original’ Balinese subak as a strictly local and
‘autonomous’ institution. As the Dutch did not interfere in
the ritual activities that accompanied the flow of the
seasons, this was left to the population as well.
Consequently irrigation management at the local level
and ritual affairs remained outside the domain of the
colonial state.
According to Lansing (2006, 2007) irrigation manage-
ment in Bali has been a bottom-up process which was and
still is supported by networks of autonomous associations
while cooperation and coordination is structured by temple
networks. Since I have not conducted research in central
Bali, I will refrain from criticizing Lansing’s findings in that
area.
17 What I want to emphasize is that south Bali offered a
different picture. Here, large scale irrigation in the pre-
colonial period was unthinkable without dynastic involve-
ment. To say this, of course, is not to deny the important role
that peasant associations play in day-to-day irrigation
management at the local level.
18 Structural changes which
occurred during the colonial period created more local
autonomy in irrigation management while temples still
played a crucial role. Hence, it could very well be the case
that what Lansing tends to perceive as authentic self
organizing processes, were actually the result of a colonial
transformation which took place at the beginning of the
twentieth century.
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